Showing posts with label crisis. Show all posts
Showing posts with label crisis. Show all posts

10/10/2016

Who Will Exit the EU Next?



By Adriano Bosoni
The European Union's future has been up for debate since the Continent's economic crisis began nearly a decade ago. But questions about the bloc's path have multiplied in recent years as Greece came close to quitting the eurozone and the United Kingdom voted to relinquish its EU membership for good. "The bloc's demise is not a matter of if, but when," Euroskeptics insisted, to which their Europhile peers replied, "The union is irreversible."
Yet like all political creations, the European Union is a momentary construction in the vast expanse of history. One day it will disappear, to be replaced by other entities, or it will continue in name only, looking and operating far differently from the European Union of today. It is impossible to know exactly when this transformation will happen or just how long the process will take. There are some clues, however, as to how the new Europe will come about and, perhaps even more important, what the agent of change will be. If anything, the Continent's current crisis is a stark reminder that despite decades of attempts to weaken it, the nation-state remains the most powerful political unit in the European Union. And as it emerges from the rubble of the Continent's latest experiment in integration, it will play a crucial role in charting Europe's course forward.

A Union That's Anything but Uniform 

Not all EU members are created equal. Losing a member that belongs to the eurozone, for example, poses a much bigger threat to the rest of the system than the departure of one that does not. The prospect of Greece quitting the currency area in 2015 was probably more frightening to France and Germany than Britain's decision to leave the bloc a year later. To be sure, both events would have serious consequences for the European Union, but a Grexit would have immediately shaken the financial foundation of the entire eurozone. The consequences of the Brexit, however, will be more gradual.
Support for EU institutions likewise varies from country to country. According to the Pew Research Center, 72 percent of Poles see the European Union positively — a view only 38 percent of Frenchmen share. Meanwhile, the latest Eurobarometer poll has put support for the eurozone at a whopping 82 percent in Luxembourg, compared with a mere 54 percent in Italy. The Euroskepticism sweeping the Continent has assumed different forms wherever it has taken root: France's National Front advocates leaving the European Union, while Italy's Five Star Movement calls for abandoning only the eurozone. At the same time, moderate political parties are increasingly seeking to end the free movement of workers and to reintroduce border controls, even as they hold onto their EU membership.
Amid these varying demands and faced with the prospect of a Grexit and Brexit, the European Union is being forced to consider the process for leaving the union and whether countries should be allowed to remain members of some parts of the bloc and not others. During discussions on the Greek bailout last year, some countries argued that leaving the eurozone also meant leaving the European Union. Others proposed ways to suspend Athens' membership in the currency area while preserving its place in the Continental bloc. A year later, the same debates are being had about Britain. Several EU members have said that access to Europe's internal market comes at price — namely, accepting EU workers — while others have proved more open to finding a compromise. Regardless of how the talks between London and Brussels shake out over the next few years, they will eventually result in a roadmap for leaving the bloc that other members could use to guide their own departures.
Of course, this raises another question: Why would countries want to leave the European Union or its structures in the first place? Again, the answer depends on the member. Some governments, whether backed by a popular referendum or parliamentary approval, might voluntarily choose to leave. Studies like the latest Eurobarometer, which showed that the Continent's trust in the European Union dropped sharply from 57 percent in 2007 to 33 percent in 2016, suggest that the British referendum may not be the last of its kind. On the other hand, some governments might be forced out of the bloc, should they become politically or financially unable to accept the conditions attached to retaining their membership. (Athens, for instance, made a conscious decision to consent to creditors' demands in order to stay in the eurozone.) Still others could depart as the entities they belong to dissolve, either as the result of a consensual decision or because of an existential crisis.

Likelihood and Consequence 

Which countries choose to renounce their membership in the European Union or its institutions will determine the bloc's fate. The organization could probably weather Croatia's departure, but it would not survive France's. There is also something to be said for the strength in numbers: The flight of a single, small economy would not endanger the European Union, but a coordinated exit of several assuredly would.
Certain political and geographic factors will affect members' chances of someday withdrawing from the Continental bloc. A large Euroskeptic population could pressure its government to opt out of the European Union, or encourage politicians to do so in pursuit of higher approval ratings. Countries with strong economies or strategic locations on the Continent could use their advantages to wrangle a better exit deal — or to exact concessions from Brussels in exchange for staying in the bloc. Members with weaker economies, meanwhile, may have less choice in the matter, since they would likely be the first casualties of any new EU crisis to arise.
By and large, EU members can be divided into four categories of countries based on the likelihood and consequences of their departure from the union.

The Outsiders 

In recent years, some of the European Union's harshest critics have been Central and Eastern European members that do not belong to the eurozone. Many of these countries view the European Union as a pact among states that should remain sovereign, and they have guarded their national powers from Brussels' ever-expanding reach. Hungary and Poland lead the pack in their resistance to deeper European integration, but states like the Czech Republic, Romania and Bulgaria have become similarly skeptical of the eurozone and proposals to increase Brussels' authority.
This is not to say that these countries are willing to desert the bloc. All are net receivers of EU aid and subsidies, and they see EU membership as a route to modernizing their economies and attracting foreign investment. Some even view the bloc as a guarantee of the West's protection against Russian aggression. The majority of voters in the region, moreover, still support the idea of staying in the European Union.
Nevertheless, Central and Eastern European states will not hesitate to assert their national rights and advocate weaker EU institutions. Their opposition to integration will lend momentum to Euroskeptic movements across the Continent seeking to renegotiate terms with Brussels. Over time, persistent anti-EU rhetoric could boost nationalist and populist forces in the region, cornering governments into making decisions that may run counter to their strategic goals.

The Fragile Periphery 

By comparison, countries in the eurozone's periphery tend to support deeper European integration, though they are also among the most vulnerable economies in the bloc. These states, which include Greece, Portugal and Spain, rely on EU subsidies and development funds to stay afloat. They will continue to back the concept of Continental integration as long as it means financial aid for their foundering economies.
The region has had its own complaints about the European Union, but most did not appear until the Continent's financial crisis — and the austerity measures that followed — began. Even then, instead of the right-wing nationalism that emerged elsewhere in the bloc, these countries largely supported left-wing parties that wanted to increase spending and restructure debt rather than close borders or restrict immigration. (Right-wing nationalism rose somewhat in Greece, but it did not rise nearly as dramatically as it did in Northern Europe.)
The states along the eurozone's southern edge may leave the currency zone at some point. But if they do, it is more likely to be in response to an unexpected crisis than a planned decision. Though these countries have similar visions of what they think the European Union looks like in the future, their political and economic weakness will make it difficult for them to form an effective alliance and to take charge of the bloc's decision-making process. And as weak growth, feeble banking sectors, large debts and high unemployment continue to take an economic toll, these countries' traditionally pro-Europe populations could slowly start to turn on the bloc.

The Coalition Builders 

The closer Euroskepticism creeps to the Continent's economic and political core, the more dangerous it will become for the bloc. Northern European countries such as Austria, Finland and the Netherlands are some of the eurozone's richest and most fiscally disciplined members. These states are largely preoccupied with protecting their national wealth from Southern Europe, and they have strong Euroskeptic parties that seek to defend their sovereignty against the interference of EU institutions. That said, they also have an incentive, given their economies' reliance on exports, to protect their markets abroad — most of which belong to the European Union.
Northern European countries tend to coordinate their moves with their neighbors and with larger powers. They are far more likely to collectively push for Continental reform or for the creation of regional blocs than they are to risk their own isolation by acting unilaterally. Though states like Denmark and Sweden are not part of the eurozone, they are culturally and ideologically similar to their counterparts in Northern Europe and could someday join them in a regional replacement for the European Union. Talk of forming a "northern eurozone" or "northern Schengen" has become common in this part of Europe.
Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia are in some ways an exception, though. They joined the European Union and eurozone to discourage Russian aggression by linking themselves as closely to the West as possible. As the home of the European Union's most important institutions, Belgium is also set apart from its Northern European neighbors, and regional politics often take precedence over national efforts to chip away at the bloc's influence. Each of these countries is unlikely to leave the European Union or eurozone of its own volition, though they could become part of a northern alliance should the bloc dissolve.

The Big Three 

If the nation-state will be the primary agent of the European Union's coming transformation, it stands to reason that the bloc's largest members — Germany, France and Italy — will be at the forefront of it.
Italy has historically seen European integration as a means to tie itself to its prosperous northern neighbors and to preserve the unity of the country. But over the past decade, Italians have become some of the Continent's most Euroskeptic citizens, thanks to their country's skyrocketing debt and political instability. Italy is therefore one of the countries that is most likely to use the threat of its exit to squeeze concessions from Brussels. Rome has already leaned on the "too big to fail" argument in its negotiations with the European Union, and future Italian administrations are likely to do the same. But as Europe continues to fragment, each threat will become more dangerous to the bloc than the last.
France and Germany, meanwhile, hold the key to the European Union's future. Even the suggestion of a French or German exit from the bloc or its currency zone would risk triggering a massive structural overhaul. By the same token, the two countries' continued buy-in could be enough to keep the European Union — or some version of it — together. But France and Germany face a paradoxical problem: For strategic reasons they need to maintain a united front, but their national interests continue to pull them apart.
France, as both a Mediterranean and Northern European nation, has found itself torn between a desire to protect its economy and the need to preserve its alliance with Germany. Paris tends to support protectionist and risk-sharing measures, and it has a high tolerance for inflation. Berlin, however, prefers to avoid policies that threaten its wealth and share the risk created by Southern Europe's weak economies. Germany would only agree to France's approach if Berlin were given more control over the fiscal policies of its neighbors — something many countries would find unacceptable. Of the two, France is more likely to act first in demanding the European Union's reorganization because of its rising nationalism and sluggish economic growth. But Germany, hamstrung by its own national interests, would find it tough to compromise with its longtime partner.
At this point, reaching a consensus on a path forward has become all but impossible for the European Union's members. To knit themselves even closer together, EU states would have to compromise on issues that are too important to budge on. The alternative option — reversing European integration — is gaining ground, but it comes with the very real possibility of leading to the bloc's complete dismantling. Members could take a middle road of sorts by choosing to keep things as they are, but even inaction would come at a price, promising even greater problems for the troubled bloc down the line.

https://www.stratfor.com/weekly/who-will-exit-eu-next

9/01/2015

Finance casinos,cheaters and false truths

These days we read and hear treat Chinese bubble the collapse of European stock exchanges with a description of the facts unless there is a possible key to try to understand what is all this apparent and continuous financial turmoil, this finance seems to be getting over the mountains Russian to follow unpredictable paths although it continues to support its rationality which is now only part of the mythology. So we should start looking at the bags as they are and not for what they are in the imagination of many.
The bags are today a huge casino where most of the bets are not covered, the stock market has been transformed into a casino by speculation that buys and sells all the time; the "trading" at high frequency has become an e-commerce based on mathematical models that make the decisions.
The markets for some time, no longer look to the long term but are made by investors operating in the short term and at the end of the day they have already sold everything in a frantic game of exchanges in which the dealer to adjust the game is not the apparent rationality Roulette has long no longer exists; financial markets do not exist as an entity but there are aseptic men in those markets operate according mindsets and cultural well-defined; to understand the markets you need to understand the design of the croupier who leads the game and the course of the bags alone do not tell the truth but hiding.
The currency-finance has been brought on to the real economy in a completely unnatural and not to his service in this way finance operates in an out of the real and only making use of mathematical and quantitative instruments helped make believe its rationality whose basic hypothesis, the absolute rationality, is totally asymmetrical with the facts and the emotional nature of man; This finance is part of the mythology. Finance rational that operates in the financial markets is at the service of personal interests and hegemonic but quite far from the common good.
The consequences are the concentration of wealth, a devastating inequality, moral degradation, poverty, unemployment, exploitation of labor ... in short, everything contrary to the intentions of rebirth made at the end of the war. The rules laid down at Bretton Woods in 1945 of currency convertibility in gold - gold exchange standard - the IMF to provide monetary stability and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948 to provide social stability to a new world lasted only twenty years precipitar for us, then, into the abyss of liquidity, "a devastating greed liquidity" wrote Keynes and the social unrest of the "bellum omnium contra omnes" that always responds to the ancestral human greed.
All because the new home of the world has been built on a socio-cultural model already then to collapse and the involvement of socio-economic restructuring has not eradicated the cultural roots that gave birth to the horrors of two world wars and the ghosts they are
sprouted as the bad fruits. "Beware of false prophets, which come to you in sheep's clothing but inwardly are ravenous wolves! By their fruits ye shall know them ..So every good tree bears good fruit and every bad tree bears bad fruit; A good tree can not bear bad fruit, nor can a bad tree bear good fruit. Every tree that does not bear good fruit is cut down and thrown into the fire. By their fruits ye shall know them "(Matthew, 7, 15-20).
In fact, after the abandonment of the gold standard of the dollar from gold, $ 28 each gram of gold, declared unilaterally by Nixon in 1971 - the creditors of the uses not trusting the dollar just wanted gold emptying its reserves - the currency has taken a His unnatural value is no longer tied to any real good and then could be printed without limit becoming an infinite money supply and as such can not be measured, which, however, is used to add value to the finished goods in which we live and work; It did imposed but to highlight completely illogical. From that moment the long wave cycle and financial bubbles has increasingly standing up, stretching and moving away from reality to live in his astral and rational but asymmetrically to the finiteness of our daily lives.
The real estate prices are not in line with the financial values ​​of the exchanges where endless future bets determines the prices today; if the value of a company or an asset grew by 15% in one day what could have happened in reality to justify that variation so important? They failed competitors or playing on emotion in a market considered entirely rational? What to know her that he did not know the day before? So rational that maybe in two days evaporates like a bubble? We are in a monetary infinite as there are countless financial instruments that are used to manipulate the actual values; we think of derivatives, now thirty times the world GDP and hand made in 5 banks, if they can make billions every day maybe in two operators who sell and buy each other the same thing - gold, dollars, raw materials, rubles, € .-, the balance between the two are zero but the market keeps a 'surge in the variations in "futures" contracts, the future and serve to determine the prices of today.
It 'very likely that this will be around a lot of finance made of nothing and no real counterparts, so the game takes place on currencies subject to speculative financial transactions to create or take advantage of problems as in the case of the yuan and the ruble before . How much of this collapse is true that depends on real factors and how much depends on the speculation? How much is the dollar, the yuan, the ruble and the euro and as ever in front of a money supply infinite gold that is the point of reference has always been the value of a currency is so undervalued?
China and Russia are countries that in recent years have bought more gold and their real riches are the natural ones; Russia has a vast amount of raw materials yet December 15, 2014 the ruble collapsed in one day 20%. The capitalization of US stocks, the Stock Exchange capitalization is a multiple of what it was in the crisis of 29, but then were listed manufacturing companies today are just many financial companies, funds, face-book, companies in the electronics industry like Apple that does not produce a single piece in the US but everything is outsourced; Use the GDP to 23% is made from paper and yet the dollar remains a strong currency, 70% of the derivatives is done to support the price of the dollar.
In countries blacklist monetary deposits are a multiple of world GDP but are inaccessible to those who would try to bring order to a coin passing of control. The supranational monetary order that has a power that no other democratic rights.
Perhaps the Chinese and ii Russians are preparing for next year to make their currencies convertible into gold and devaluation, partly justified, is part of that plan that if implemented some serious problems to speculative finance would ultimately create it; The gold derivatives made by investment banks are all a short or very short term to cover themselves from the mountains of derivatives made to keep down the value of the precious metal.
Perhaps it would be good that we begin to deal with reality and not with the manufacturers of dreams and cotton candy and it is also the only way to bring speculative finance under an order which respects people and society. Undoubtedly this danger is perceived, given the reactions of finance, the Wall Street gurus who see questioned their hegemonic model begin to say with finality that the Chinese model is finished (their does not?), To think that that model supported with massive purchases of Treasury bonds TB-uses - the debt of the US, a country ranked third in the world for inequality lived for too long a slave of finance that has gnawed.
Even Lawrence Summers had recently recommended to his country "does not outsource more and return to the real economy" denying exactly what was said at the beginning of the century when in 10 years was outsourced 45 percent of the manufacturing in honor of " create shareholder value "mantra created and promoted by the most prestigious American universities. But rebuilding manufacturing fell to 11% of GDP is very difficult with 300 million people who provide jobs.
Finance has moved and is moving with the logic of the Locust
desertifying the real economy to further the goal of accumulation in the short term that pushes a hyper productivity of inputs including labor and to the overconsumption; the surplus resulting ends up in the coffers of black-listed countries but producing countries there is nothing left but despair and sorrow; now becomes an immense colony of "lemurs" running striven to throw himself into the abyss. "There's only one problem, one for the world: to give men a spiritual meaning, spiritual restlessness ... You can not live refrigerators, budgets, policy, crossword (cellular, of finance, nothing of consumption for its own sake, we would say today). We can no longer. You can not live without poetry, without heat or love "(Antoine de Saint Exupery, the last letter written to friends July 21, 1944, would be published in" Le Figaro "after the war).
Fabrizio Pezzani: Professor of Planning and Control Bocconi University.Google translation

8/15/2015

Se Berlino rischia di essere il nemico della Ue.

Le scelte dell’amministrazione Merkel alimentano pericolosi squilibri della zona Euro. Di Philippe Legrain
La zona euro ha un problema e il proble
ma è la Germania. Le politiche tedesche
del “rubamazzo” e più in generale la ri
sposta alla crisi che la Germania ha indi
rizzato si sono rivelate disastrose. A sette anni
dall’inizio della crisi, l’economia della zona euro
sta andando peggio di come andò in Europa du
rante la Grande Depressione degli anni Trenta.
Gli sforzi del governo tedesco volti a schiacciare
la Grecia e costringerla ad abbandonare la valu
ta unica hanno destabilizzato l’unione moneta
ria. Finché l’amministrazione Merkel continue
rà ad abusare della sua posizione dominante di
principale creditore per portare avanti i suoi mi
opi interessi, la zona euro non potrà prosperare
– e potrebbe non sopravvivere.
L’immenso surplus delle partite correnti
della Germania – i risparmi in eccesso genera
ti dall’abbassamento dei salari per sostenere
le esportazioni – è stato sia una causa della cri
si della zona euro, sia un ostacolo per risolver
la. Prima della crisi quel surplus alimentava i
prestiti “cattivi” delle banche tedesche all’Eu
ropa meridionale e all’Irlanda. Adesso che il
surplus annuale della Germania – cresciuto fi
no a raggiungere i 233 miliardi di euro (255 mi
liardi di sterline), avvicinandosi all’8% del Pil
– non è più “riciclato” nell’Europa meridiona
le, la depressa domanda interna del Paese
esporta deflazione, che esaspera le disgrazie
debitorie della zona euro.
Le eccedenze della Germania nei confronti
dell’estero sono in palese contrasto con le nor
mative previste dalla zona euro al riguardo di
pericolosi squilibri. Il governo Merkel, però
esercitando pressioni sulla Commissione Euro
pea, ha ottenuto il via libera. Ciò trasforma in una
presa in giro la sua affermazione di essere la pa
ladina della zona euro, come in un club che ha
delle regole. Infatti, la Germania le infrange im
punemente, le altera per adattarle alle proprie
esigenze, o addirittura le inventa a suo piacere.
In verità, proprio mentre spinge gli altri alle ri
forme, la Germania ignora le raccomandazioni
della Commissione: sta obbligando la Grecia ad
elevare l’età pensionabile – uno dei requisiti ne
cessari per concederle un ulteriore programma
di aiuti dall’eurozona – nel momento stesso in
cui abbassa la propria. Chiede insistentemente
che i negozi greci restino aperti anche di dome
nica, benché quelli tedeschi siano chiusi.
Sembra quasi che per la Germania il corporativismo
debba essere spazzato via altrove ma protetto in
casa. Oltre a rifiutarsi di correggere la sua econo
mia, la Germania ha rifilato i costi della crisi agli
altri. Allo scopo di soccorrere le banche del Pae
se invischiate nelle decisioni di erogare prestiti
“cattivi”, Angela Merkel ha infranto la regola del
“no-bailout” prevista dal Trattato di Maastricht
che vieta ai governi membri di finanziare gli al
tri, e ha costretto i contribuenti europei a eroga
re prestiti a una Grecia insolvente. Nello stesso
modo, i prestiti a Irlanda, Portogallo e Spagna da
parte dei governi della zona euro in primo luogo
hanno salvato in extremis le banche locali insol
venti, e di riflesso i loro creditori tedeschi.
A peggiorare ancor più le cose, in cambio di
questi aiuti la cancelliera ha ottenuto un con
trollo molto maggiore su tutti i budget dei go
verni della zona euro con una camicia di forza
fiscale che svigorisce la domanda e pone vinco
li alla democrazia: normative più rigide per
l’eurozona e un fiscal compact. L’influenza del
la Germania ha dato vita nella zona euro a
un’unione bancaria asimmetrica e piena di bu
chi. Le Sparkassen tedesche – banche di rispar
mio con uno stato patrimoniale complessivo di
circa mille miliardi di euro – sono esenti dal
controllo e dalla supervisione della Banca cen
trale europea, mentre le mega-banche poco ca
pitalizzate come Deutsche Bank e i marci pre
statori regionali di proprietà statale del paese
hanno ottenuto un poco plausibile certificato
di sana e robusta costituzione.
L’unica regola della zona euro ritenuta sacro
santa è l’irrevocabilità dell’appartenenza. Non
esiste alcuna clausola contrattuale che preveda
la possibilità di uscirne, perché l’unione mone
taria è concepita come un primo passo verso
un’unione politica, e perché in caso contrario
degenererebbe in un regime pericolosamente
inflessibile e traballante di tassi a cambio fisso.
La Germania non ha trasgredito soltanto a que
sta regola: oltre a ciò, il suo ministro delle finan
ze, Wolfgang Schäuble, ne ha da poco inventata
di sana pianta un’altra, quella secondo cui nella
zona euro l’alleggerimento del debito è vietato
per giustificare il suo vergognoso comporta
mento nei confronti della Grecia. In conseguen
za di tutto ciò, l’appartenenza della Germania al
la zona euro – e per estensione quella di tutti i
suoi membri – è subordinata all’ubbidienza al
governo tedesco. La zona euro ha disperata
mente bisogno di alternative mainstream a que
sto asimmetrico “Consenso di Berlino” nel qua
le gli interessi dei creditori sono anteposti a
quelli di chiunque altro e nel quale la Germania
domina tuto il resto. Il Merkelismo sta provo
cando stagnazione economica, polarizzazione
politica, e un brutto nazionalismo. Francia, Italia
ed europei di ogni colore politico devono ado
perarsi subito e intervenire proponendo altre
visioni di ciò che dovrebbe essere l’eurozona.
Una possibilità sarebbe quella di un maggio
re federalismo. Istituzioni politiche comuni,
responsabili nei confronti degli elettori della
zona euro, verrebbero a costituire una contro
parte fiscale democratica alla Bce e aiutereb
bero a contenere la potenza tedesca. Ma la cre
scente animosità tra gli stati membri della zona
euro, e l’erosione del sostegno all’integrazione
europea sia nei paesi creditori sia in quelli debi
tori, stanno a indicare che un maggiore federa
lismo è politicamente inattuabile, in teoria ad
dirittura pericoloso.
Una possibilità migliore sarebbe quella di
orientarsi verso una zona euro più flessibile,
nella quale i rappresentanti nazionali eletti ab
biano maggiore voce in capitolo. Una volta ri
pristinata la regola del “no-bailout”, poi, i gover
ni avrebbero più margine di manovra per per
seguire politiche anticicliche e rispondere alle
mutevoli priorità degli elettori. Per rendere
plausibile un simile sistema, si dovrebbe creare
un meccanismo di ristrutturazione del debito
dei governi insolventi. Ciò, unitamente alla ri
forma delle direttive previste per la capitalizza
zione delle banche permetterebbe ai mercati, e
non alla Germania, di porre un freno ai prestiti
davvero eccessivi. Preferibilmente, anche la
Bce dovrebbe ricevere il mandato di agire da
prestatore di ultima istanza per i governi illiqui
di ma solventi. Questi cambiamenti potrebbero
raccogliere un ampio consenso – e servire gli in
teressi della stessa Germania. I membri della
zona euro sono imprigionati in un matrimonio
infelice nel quale la Germania spadroneggia.
Ma la paura, da sola, non basta a tenere insieme
per sempre un rapporto. Se Angela Merkel non
rinsavirà, finirà col distruggerlo.

Philippe Legrain è stato consigliere economico
della Commissione Europea con Barroso, dal 2011 al 2014.
È Visiting senior fellow alla London School of Economics

9/18/2013

Your taxes

That's where they end your taxes 

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Cancro alla prostata: test eccessivi e trattamenti eccessivi

Scritto da Bruce Davidson tramite The Brownstone Institute, L'eccessiva risposta medica alla pandemia di Covid h...